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Abstract
This paper examines the conditions needed for confirming goal achievement by
checking cases characterized by task-oriented dialogues and communicative states.
Task-oriented dialogues are classified by their directness toward goal achievement
and confirmation. Communicative states are derived from the definition of a persis-
tent goal as formalized by Cohen and Levesque. This paper also discusses fragments
of actual task-oriented dialogues, and points out that agents in task-oriented dialogue
satisfy the goal confirming conditions.
1 Introduction
When we analyze human activities being done for some purpose, we usually idealize the
agents as being rational. Rationality is defined as having a goal and expending energy
to achieve it. Of course, rational agents should perform actions intended to achieve
optimal progress vis-a-vis the goal with minimal effort [1, 2]. This understanding usually
assumes that the rational agents have unlimited resources to achieve the goal. In real
situations, however, humans have only bounded resources such as memory and time,
and, hence, might fail to achieve the goal. Bratman stipulated agents' rationality with
regard to resource-boundedness [3]. Resource-bounded agents should keep holding to the
goal even if it cannot immediately be achieved provided there is no reason to abandon
it. Cohen and Levesque formalized intentions with regard to this goal persistence based
on dynamic logic, and extended the analysis to consider cooperative activities such as
dialogues [4,-5, 6, 7].
When two agents jointly try to achieve a goal, their having only goal persistence
is insufficient to model everyday activities. Confusion can develop as in the situation
wherein one agent has achieved the goal, but the other is unaware of this achievement. In
another case, one agent knows the goal can never be satisfied, but the other does not know
that the goal is unsatisfiable. Finally, one agent may know the supergoal was abandoned,
but the other does not know of this abandonment. In all such cases, the second agent
might keep trying to achieve the goal in vain because of goal persistence. To eliminate
confusion, the agents should be able to confirm the status of the goal, i.e. if it is achieved,
unsatisfiable or if the supergoal is abandoned, to prevent any agent from endlessly trying
to achieve the goal. That is, resource-bounded agents should have goal persistence and
the ability to communicate the goal status.
Effective communication of the goal status is possible only if mutual belief can be
attained between the rational agents. Mutual belief is the infinite nesting of belief about
each other's belief, and a conjunction of each other's one-sided mutual belief (The rigid
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definition will be shown in section 4). Hence, an infinite number of communication acts
seems to be necessary to build mutual belief. However, if the agent's action or utterance
can be observed and accepted by the other, and the agent knows of this observation and
acceptance, then the agent can predict the other's belief from his capability of prediction.
These predictions can be nested infinitely, and, thus, one-sided mutual belief can be
obtained. This description can apply to both agents. Combining these one-sided mutual
beliefs constructs mutual belief. Therefore, under the assumption of mutual observability,
acceptability and knowledge of the other's abilities, normal communication can be thought
of as the exchange of initial mutual belief, which can be developed into mutual belief in
a systematic way.
In this paper, we derive the conditions needed for confirming goal achievement based
on Cohen and Levesque's formulation of joint intention in task-oriented dialogues. To
derive the conditions we refer to mutual belief, which amounts to infinite nesting of
belief, and is, thus, computational intractable. We show how mutual belief is attained in a
systematic way under the assumption of mutual observation, acceptance, and knowledge of
both agents' abilities. We also examine fragments used in actual task-oriented dialogues,
which can be understood as representing the behaviors of resource-bounded agents. In
what follows, we discuss only communication between two agents, but this discussion can
be straightforwardly applied to more than two agents.
Based on the idea in this paper, we have proposed parameterised reactive planning as
a computational model to simulate some interesting phenomena in actual task-oriented
dialogues, see [8].
2 Cohen and Levesque's Formalism for Rational
Agents
Cohen and Levesque formalized joint intention using dynamic logic [4, 5, 6, 7]. We briefly
explain their representation to discuss the goal achievement confirming conditions in the
next chapter.
Representations (BEL x p) and (KNOW x p) are taken to mean that agent x believes and
knows proposition p, respectively; (GOAL x p) indicates that agent x has goal proposition
p; (M B x y p) and (M K x y p) mean that agents x and y mutually believe and mutually
know proposition p; (MG x y p) shows that agents x and y mutually believe they have goal
p; (DONE x a) and (DOES x a) mean that action a was just done and will be done next
by agent x, respectively; (EVENTUALLY p), (NEVER p) and (UNTIL q p) means that p
will be true at some point in the future, will not be true at any point in the future, and
will remain true until q is true.
A persistent goal is the most important concept in defining the intention of resource-
bounded agents: if an agent has a persistent goal, he should keep trying to achieve it
even when he fails to do so. However, this definition is too simple to consider the cases
where the agent stops trying, that is, when he believes that the goal can never be satisfied
or when the supergoal has been abandoned. Thus two more preconditions are needed:
that the agent has a goal and that he does not believe that the goal has already been
accomplished. We can now give the definition of a persistent goal in Definition 1: if
an agent x has a persistent goal p with regard to a supergoal q, he should keep trying
to achieve goal p until he believes that it was achieved, that it has never been true, or
supergoal q was abandoned.
Definition 1 (PGOAL x p q) dg
(BEL x p) A (GOAL x (EVENTUALLY p)) A
(KNOW x (UNTIL [(BEL x p) V (BEL x (NEVER p)) V (BEL x q)]
(GOAL x (EVENTUALLY p))))
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Intention is stipulated using a persistent goal in Definition 2. The object of the
intention, that is the argument of the predicate INTEND, is an action, while the object of
goal persistence, that is, the argument of predicate PGOAL is a proposition. To convert
an action to a proposition, predicates DONE and DOES are introduced, the meanings of
which were explained above. This conversion alone as such is not enough to define the
intention, however, the definition needs to account for the determination to perform an
action, and for between intended and unintended actions to be distinguished. For this
purpose, the action formula p?;a is introduced, which should be read as "action a with
p holding initially." Thus, Definition 2 reads as follows: that agent x's intention to do
action a with regard to supergoal q is stipulated as that agent x has a persistent goal that
performing action a while he has the intention of performing it.
Definition 2 (INTEND x a q)
(PGOAL x (DONE x [BEL x (DOES x a)]?;a) q)
The definition of a joint persistent goal can be obtained from the definition of a
persistent goal, if the definitions of belief, knowledge and goal are replaced with those of
mutual belief, mutual knowledge, and a mutual goal. However, this replacement is not
enough to capture the characteristics of the cooperative behavior between agents. For
instance, if an agent has a persistent goal, and he does not know that it has already been
achieved or that he will not be able to achieve it, he might keep trying to achieve the
goal. To rectify this problem, a mutual weak goal, which is the mutual belief of a weak
goal, is introduced: For this we need the definition of a weak goal, given in Definition 3.
Definition 3 (WG x y p q) d e f
(BEL x p) A (GOAL x (EVENTUALLY p))] V
[(BEL x p) A (GOAL x (EVENTUALLY (MB x y p)))] V
[(BEL x (NEVER p)) A (GOAL x (EVENTUALLY (MB x y (NEVER
[(BEL	 q) A (GOAL x (EVENTUALLY (MB x y q)))]
This definition introduces conditional goal states such that if agent x believes that goal
p was not achieved, he has goal p, or if agent x believes that goal p was achieved, he has
the goal of sharing the goal achievement mutual belief with agent y, or if agent x believes
that goal p can never be satisfied, he has the goal of sharing the mutual belief that p
cannot be satisfied with agent y, or if agent x believes that supergoal q was abandoned,
he has the goal of sharing the supergoal abandonment mutual belief with agent y.
Definition 4 (JPG x y p q) dg
(MB x y p) A (MG x y (EVENTUALLY p)) A
(MK x y (UNTIL [(MB x y p) V (MB x y (NEVER p)) V (MB x y q)]
(WMG x y p)))
Using mutual belief, mutual knowledge, a mutual goal, and a weak mutual goal, a
joint persistent goal can be defined as in Definition 4. In other words, if agents x and y
jointly have persistent goal p, they mutually believe that goal p was not achieved, and
mutually want to achieve goal p, and as long as they believe that goal p has not been
achieved, or that goal p is achievable, or that supergoal q has not been abandoned, they
keep trying to achieve the goal determined by both of their weak goals. A joint intention,
given in Definition 5, is straightforwardly developed from the intention of both agents,
where belief and the persistent goal are replaced by mutual belief and a joint persistent
goal:
Definition 5 (JI x y a q)
(JPG x y (DONE x y [MB x y (DOES x y a)]?; a) q)
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A can
achieve
A can
confirm
P can
achieve
P can
confirm
V .N./
V V x
x V V
V x V x
x V V .N./
x V x
x x A./ V
x x V x
Table 1: A part of the classification of task-oriented dialogues
3 The Achievement of Communicative Goals
In task-oriented dialogues, agents are expected to be cooperative in trying to complete
the task sometimes given by experimenters.
Task-oriented dialogues can be classified into sixteen types according to whether the
agents can directly achieve the goal and confirm the achievement or not. (The word
`directly' means 'without the other's help'). We deal with eight cases out of sixteen
because we think the cases where the partner or the instructee cannot directly achieve
the goal are very rare in task-oriented dialogues. We show these eight cases in Table 1.
These cases again can be classified into four cases where (1) only one agent can directly
both achieve the goal and confirm the goal achievement, (2) one agent can directly only
achieve the goal and the other can directly only confirm the goal achievement, and (3)
neither can directly confirm the goal achievement and only the partner can directly achieve
the goal.
The agents in the first type of dialogue might complete the task alone, or communicate
their request(s) to each other. This includes the one-agent situation except that the
agent has the ability to communicate, that is, to ask aid in order to complete the task
and interactive situations between a teacher and a pupil. This type of dialogue is not
so interesting from the viewpoint of dialogue research, especially given the fact that the
agents might not communicate. The second type is that only one agent can directly
achieve the goal, but cannot confirm its achievement, while the other can directly achieve
the goal, but cannot directly confirm its achievement. This occurs in the application
of computer-human interaction such as in a database interface and text generation. The
third type of dialogue includes route-telling as in MapTask dialogues discussed in section 5.
To examine the communicative states caused by the joint intention of some commu-
nicative act, we check the definition of joint persistent goal, which can be thought of as
a result of the intended action for the two agents. If the agents jointly have a persistent
goal, and do not think that it was achieved, that it can never be satisfied, or that the
supergoal was abandoned, they can have, independently, four possible belief states. The
communicative states can be classified into sixteen patterns through the combination of
the four possible belief states of the two agents. The four belief states are i) that an
agent does not think that the goal was achieved, ii) that an agent thinks that the goal
was achieved, iii) that an agent thinks that the goal can never be achieved, and iv) that
an agent thinks that the supergoal was abandoned according to the definition of a weak
goal given in Definition 3. In the following, we examine the sixteen communicative states
for the three types of task-oriented dialogues described above.
1. only one agent can directly both achieve the goal and confirm the goal achievement.
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If the first agent capable of achieving the goal and confirming the achievement does
not believe that the goal was achieved, he keeps trying to achieve the goal while the
second agent takes different actions based on his belief states: If the second agent
also does not believe that the goal was achieved based on either his confirming abil-
ity or communication with the first agent, he independently tries to achieve it; If
the second agent believes that it was achieved, that it can never be satisfied, or that
the supergoal was abandoned, he communicates this information to the first agent,
who is supposed to receive the message in finite time.
If the first agent believes that the goal was achieved, he tries to communicate the
achievement: If the second agent does not believe that the goal was achieved, he
independently tries to achieve it, but when in finite time he receives the first agent's
message, he normally stops his attempts. If the second agent believes that it was
achieved, he tries to communicate the achievement to the first agent, ans this com-
munications is normally successful; If the second agent believes that it can never be
satisfied, or that the supergoal was abandoned, he communicates that belief to the
first agent, and this normally causes a conflict with him.
If the first agent believes that the goal can never be satisfied or that the goal was
abandoned, he tries to communicate that belief: If the second agent does not believe
that the goal was achieved, he independently tries to achieve it, but when in finite
time receives the first agent's message, he normally stops his attempts. If the second
agent believes that the goal was achieved, he tries to communicate the achievement,
and this causes a conflict with the first agent. If the second agent believes that
the goal can never be satisfied or that the supergoal was abandoned, he tries to
communicate that belief, and this normally leads to an agreement between both
agents to abandon the goal and/or the supergoal.
2. One agent can directly achieve the goal, but cannot confirm its achievement, while
the other can directly achieve the goal, but cannot directly confirm achievement.
The first agent who can directly achieve the goal should consult the second agent
to determine if the goal has been achieved whenever the agent performs an action
for goal achievement. The second agent, who is usually assumed to be cooperative,
advises him on goal achievement.
3. Neither agent can directly confirm goal achievement, but the partner can directly
achieve the goal.
The agents need to establish some protocol based on whatever they can use to judge
goal achievement, because neither can directly confirm the goal achievement. Sup-
pose at least one agent can detect a situation through his actions or communication
that would be ameliorated by achieving the goal. If the first agent who cannot di-
rectly achieve the goal, can detect the trouble, he can give the second agent advice
as to its status; If the second agent who can achieve the goal, can detect the trouble,
he can make his own check on goal achievement; If both can detect the trouble, the
second agent who can achieve the goal can confirm achievement by checking his
actions and the first agent's communication to him. That is, if the second agent
does not detect the situation and the first agent's communication does not indicate
the situation, he can safely believe that he achieved the goal; If the second agent
stops performing the confirming action or moves to another goal, the first agent can
M. lshizaki
believe that the goal was achieved. One caveat is that the correctness of judging
achievement is limited by the existence of a situation directly impacted by goal
completion and the agent's ability to detect the situation. Judgement will be false
if the detection is not accurate. If neither can detect the situation, or a suitable
situation does not exist, they cannot intentionally perform some action to achieve
the goal.
The above discussion did not deal with how the agents resolute their conflicts. This is
because there are no conflict resolution algorithms which can apply to all situations even
if we limit our domain to task-oriented dialogues.
4 The Attainment of Mutual Belief
Mutual belief MB between two agents is stipulated by a conjunction of each other's one-
sided mutual belief BMB as shown in Definition 6.
Definition 6 (MB x y p) dg (BM B x y p) A (BMB y x p)
Using Definition 7 of alternating belief ABEL, one-sided mutual belief BMB is stipu-
lated in Definition 8.
Definition 7 (ABEL n x y p) d!--1 (BEL x (BEL y (BEL x 	 (BEL x p )...)
n	 n
	 ./
Definition 8 (BMB x y p) de-f V n (ABEL n x y p)
The agent can obtain one-sided mutual belief based on his assumptions that the part-
ner has accepted the agent's observation and message, and that the partner knows the
agent's assumption of the partner's acceptance. The first assumption constructs two and
three nested beliefs, (BEL x (BEL y p)) and (BEL x (BEL y (BEL x p))), from the agent's
base belief (BEL x p) if the agent sends the message about his belief such as proposition
p; The second assumption enables us to build four and five nested beliefs, (BEL x (BEL
y (BEL x (BEL y p)))) and (BEL x (BEL y (BEL x (BEL y (BEL x p))))) based on the two
and three nested beliefs. This application can continue infinitely and results in one-sided
mutual belief. In normal dialogues, the partner's acceptance need not be assumed be-
cause he replies to the agent's message, which can be used to judge if the partner accepts
the agent's message. Moreover, if the partner actually accepts the agent's belief, he can
construct his one-sided mutual belief based on his knowledge of the agent's assumption.
The agent and the partner cannot separately obtain mutual belief, but the system or
the world, which consists of the agent and the partner, can be thought of as assuring
the existence of mutual belief. In short, under the agent's assumptions of the partner's
acceptance and knowledge, and the partner's actual acceptance and knowledge of the the
agent's assumptions, the agent and the partner can achieve mutual belief by exchanging
their thoughts.
In the following, we examine four types of task-oriented dialogues about how the
assumptions for obtaining mutual belief can or cannot be satisfied.
1. only one agent can directly both achieve the goal and confirm the goal achievement.
If the agent's opinion does not conflict with the partner's in such as cases where
at least one of them does not believe that the goal was achieved, and where both
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of them agree about the goal state, the agents should accept each other's opinions
and should be aware of each other's acceptance. This satisfies the conditions for
constructing mutual belief.
If the agent's opinion conflicts with the partner's in such as cases where the agents
have differing opinions as to the goal state, the agents should harmonize their opin-
ions through negotiation. Because the negotiation can not be guaranteed to be
successful, some protocol is needed to adjudicate the conflict.
2. One agent can directly achieve the goal, but cannot confirm its achievement, while
the other can directly achieve the goal, but cannot directly confirm achievement.
The agent who cannot directly confirm the goal, should accept the other's report
about the goal state as long as the agent does not communicate information that
contradicts goal achievement. They should know each other's acceptance to obtain
mutual belief. If one agent detects trouble, while the other thinks that the goal was
achieved, they need to negotiate, the completion of which is not guaranteed to be
successful.
3. Neither agent can directly confirm goal achievement, but the partner can directly
achieve the goal.
Because neither agent can directly confirm the goal, they should negotiate about
the goal status. If they can detect a situation that would be ameliorated by goal
achievement, achievement should be judged by the detection of the situation and
the absence of any communication indicating otherwise. This establishes a basic
belief and the knowledge of the protocol can construct a nested belief on the basic
one, which leads to mutual belief. If they cannot detect the situation they cannot
determine the goal state, which falls out of the scope of task-oriented dialogues .
5 Discussion
5.1 Confirming the goal achievement
We examined a task-oriented dialogue database, called MapTask, which was developed at
the Human Communication Research Centre of the University of Edinburgh [9]. In the
MapTask dialogue, the agent describes a route on his map so that the partner can draw
it on his own map. The MapTask dialogue is thus the type of dialogue in which neither
agents can directly confirm achievement, but at least one of them can directly achieve
the goal. The agent and the partner have slightly different maps: The landmarks on the
agent's map might not be on the partner's map and vice versa, and the landmarks whose
positions are the same on the two maps might have different names. Because of the dif-
ferences, the agents often need to negotiate to describe the route. The MapTask dialogue
Database consists of 128 conversations. The average number of turns per conversation is
162, and the average number of tokens per turn is 7.09.
The dialogue fragment is taken from the MapTask dialogue database, and the cor-
responding map is shown in Fig. 1. In this dialogue, goal achievement was confirmed
based on the fact that the agent and the partner did not detect any trouble that would
jeopardise achievement, as discussed in section 3
Agent:	 Right round the white water, or round the rapids ...
Partner:	 Taking it round from the top, or?
Agent:	 From the top, but stay close 'cause don't ...
WYite
water
0
Rocks
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The agent's map The partner's map
Figure 1: The agent's and the partner's maps for MapTask dialogue fragment
otherwise you're going to be in that stone creek.
A fragment of MapTask dialogue.
In the dialogue fragment, the agent's instruction is gradually elaborated over a few
turns to correctly inform the partner about the route. In the first turn, the agent does not
tell the partner whether the route starts from the top or the bottom of the white water,
which is indispensable information to the partner in constructing the route. In the second
turn, the partner asks the agent whether the route runs from the top or the bottom. In
the third turn, the agent gives the partner the information that the route starts from the
top. In addition, the agent instructs the partner not to perform a problematic action,
that is, going through the stone creek.
5.2 Attaining mutual belief
Clark and Marshall proposed co-presence heuristics to tackle mutual belief paradox, ex-
aming the problem of definite reference [10]. Mutual belief is defined infinite nested belief
of each other's, but in our every day life, we are not bothered by checking infinite belief to
do some action like making an utterance. As in their paper, just truncating the nesting
level cannot solve the problem, because we can think of situations where we need deeper
nesting level. The example from their discussion clearly shows the case. Suppose we cut
off the nesting level up to two, that is agent A's belief on the partner B's belief.
On Wednesday morning, Ann and Bob read the early edition of the newspaper
and discuss the fact that it says that A Day at the Races is showing that night
at the Roxy. Later, after Bob has left, Ann gets the late edition, which prints
a correction, which is that it is Monkey business that is actually showing that
night. Later Ann sees Bob and asks, "Have you ever seen the movie showing
at the Roxy tonight?"
For Ann to use definite reference to the movie properly, she needs one more nesting
level, namely A's belief on B's belief on A's. We can make this kind example to nth
nesting level. This means a simple truncation approach cannot handle the problem.
Their proposal can be represented with the schemata below:
Evidence + Assumptions + Induction Schema = Mutual Knowledge
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Evidence is classified into physical co-presence, linguistic co-presence and community
membership. Physical co-presence describes the cases where the agents share their sit-
uations. Their example is the situation both agents see a candle. Based on normality
assumptions like they know they have the abilities to see things, they have a ground for
mutual belief and can develop it to mutual belief using their inductive abilities. Linguis-
tic co-presence is achieved by an utterance like I bought a candle yesterday. Community
membership is for the facts or beliefs that the community member shares with each other.
Their example is that the first president of the United States is George Washington can
be a shared fact among learned American.
Their idea is very similar to our proposal in that based on the normality assumptions
for the partner's abilities, the seeds or evidence of mutual belief can be expanded into
mutual belief inductively. But our idea is different from theirs. Firstly, they assume the
agents have mutual belief through induction. Our treatment needs to have the seeds of
mutual belief, not mutual belief itself. If the agents need to deal with deeper nesting of
belief, the agents will induce it. Secondly they did not inspect what actually is a ground
with respect to a rigid framework like Cohen and Leveque's. Thus, if we apply Clark and
Marshal's analysis to dialogues, we cannot distinguish what is acquired and what is not
acquired through communication. Our analysis clarified the ground for dialogues. The
ground consists of the agent's belief, the agent's belief on the partner's and the agent belief
on the partner's on the agent's. The second belief is obtained from communication with
the partner. The third is ascribe to the partner based on the partner's observability. Here
observability includes not only seeing, but also hearing. Lastly, they did not distinguish
between one sided mutual belief and mutual belief. As we discussed before, mutual belief
cannot be attained within one agent. What the agent can have is one-sided mutual belief.
This distinction shows the change of point of view. If you talk about the mutual belief,
you take the view from an overall system. If you take the view of each agent, you cannot
talk about real mutual belief.
Sperber and Wilson examined the role of mutual belief from the viewpoint of Relevance
theory {11]. They pointed out the computational difficulties of Clark and Marshall's idea.
Induction and checking normality conditions require us much effort to establish mutual
belief. But we do not usually feel much difficulties as in making an utterance including
definite reference. In addition to the argument of the computational cost, they cast doubt
on the role of mutual belief in communication. In our comprehension process, we need
a context to retrieve some items to understand the partner's utterance. They argued
we cannot search all items in mutual belief (Please remember mutual belief defined by
Clark and Schaefer include the items obtained from community membership) in real time.
Hence, the context should be much smaller than the size of mutual belief. Moreover, they
suggested our normal communication might have clarification instead of checking nesting
belief to secure the communication success. Their first argument is in line with our claim.
We have only the seed of mutual belief instead f full mutual belief, and deal with normality
conditions as default. The second and third arguments does not directly relate to our
claim. We did not claim mutual belief should be established for sound communication
as Clark and Marshall did. Rather, we think our treatment of mutual belief using the
seed can accord with their second and third arguments, because our treatment does not
require us to establish mutual belief for its own sake.
6 Conclusion
The conditions for confirming goal achievement were clarified, considering cases character-
ized by different types of task-oriented dialogues and communicative states. Task-oriented
dialogues are classified by the directness of the goal achievement and the confirmation
of the goal. Communicative states are derived from the definition of a persistent goal
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formalized by Cohen and Levesque. The conditions for confirming goal achievement can
be reduced to two cases. One case is that if at least one agent can directly confirm the
goal, and the other does not communicate about any trouble or have a different opinion
about the goal state, they can confirm goal achievement, and can have mutual belief
about the achievement; otherwise, they need some communication protocol to settle their
differences. The other case is that if neither agent can directly confirm the goal, but at
least one agent can detect trouble in goal achievement, they can confirm the achievement
based on the lack of trouble detection and the lack of communication about the exis-
tence of trouble. By combining both cases the agents can achieve a mutual belief of goal
achievement.
This paper also indicated that agents in actual task-oriented dialogues such as the
MapTask, satisfy the goal confirming conditions.
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